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1Abstract
Because of economic growth and a strong increase in global energy demand
the demand for fossil fuels and therefore also greenhouse gas emissions are in-
creasing, although climate policy should lead to the opposite eﬀect. The coal
market is of special relevance as coal is available in many countries and often
their ﬁrst choice to meet energy demand. In this paper we assess possible in-
teractions between climate policies and the global steam coal market. Possible
market adjustments between demand centers through market eﬀects are inves-
tigated with a numerical model of the global steam coal market until 2030: the
“COALMOD-World” model. The COALMOD-World model is an equilibrium
model that computes future trade ﬂows, infrastructure investments and prices
until 2030. We investigate three speciﬁc designs of climate policy: a unilateral
European climate policy, an Indonesian export-limiting policy and a carbon
capture and storage (CCS) fast-roll out policy in the broader context of cli-
mate policy and market constraints. We ﬁnd that market adjustment eﬀects
in the coal market can have signiﬁcant positive and negative impacts on the
eﬀectiveness of climate policies.
Keywords: climate policy, future coal production, energy, numerical mod-
eling, international trade.1 Introduction
This paper presents an analysis of the diﬀerent possible interactions between climate
policies and the global steam coal market. Worldwide steam coal consumption is
continuously growing, drawn by economic growth and increasing electricity demand
in Asia. The use of coal is also a major contributor to global carbon dioxide emis-
sions that have a potentially high adverse eﬀect on the future climate. Hence, the
relationship between the coal market and climate policy is of prime importance for
the eﬀectiveness of these policies and needs to be investigated further.
In the set of possible interactions we show that a shift of production towards
the present due to strategic behavior of coal resource owners as a reaction to future
climate policies is not to be expected. We therefore concentrate our analysis on pure
supply and demand market eﬀects using the COALMOD-World model described in
Haftendorn et al. (2010). This multi-period model of the global steam coal market
calculates yearly future market equilibria. We implement three diﬀerent climate pol-
icy shocks in diﬀerent climate policy and market environments already in place. The
scenarios are: a unilateral European climate policy, an Indonesian export-limiting
supply-side policy and a carbon capture and storage (CCS) fast roll-out policy.
Our main ﬁndings are that coal market adjustments eﬀects can have a potentially
adverse eﬀect on climate policy eﬀectiveness in the case of an unilateral European
climate policy. However this eﬀect never overcompensates saved emissions; even a
unilateral European climate eﬀort will always be beneﬁcial to the global climate.
In the case of the Indonesian supply-side scenario and the CCS fast-roll out policy
we see positive market adjustment eﬀects that speak for the eﬀectiveness of these
less conventional measures. After having evaluated the diﬀerent modeling results, we
draw conclusions and policy recommendations for the climate policy of the European
Union (EU).
2 Assessment of positive modeling approaches
2.1 Overview of possible modeling approaches
There are various modeling approaches at our disposition to help us understand
what possible eﬀects we can expect from the interaction between climate policies
and the global steam coal market. In essence, all these models are positive, meaning
that they are “constructed with the objective of better explaining (or reproducing)
observed resource prices and production levels”(Pindyck, 1981). The classical model
for the theory of exhaustible resource extraction was developed by Hotelling (1931)
3and has recently been used for the assessment of climate policies (see Sinn, 2008). In
the following section 2.2 we determine if these models can be applied to the global
steam coal market.
Another type of modeling approach for resource markets is based on the concept
of the Hubbert curve ﬁrst described by M. King Hubbert (1959). The core mathe-
matical assumption of this model is that cumulative resource production follows a
logistic growth path that derived with respect to time yields the well-known sym-
metrical bell shaped curve of yearly production output; the summit of the curve
representing the “peak” of the production rate. It is mathematically possible to
estimate the shape of the curve and, thus, the peak year as well as the ultimately
recoverable reserves, deﬁned as the surface under the curve, based solely on histori-
cal production data. This simple technique is subject to controversy. Its proponents
claim that “the Hubbert curves are based on [...] production and not on ill-deﬁned
and subjective [...] ’reserves’” and that “historical production trends reﬂect the
prevailing economics prior to the time of production” (Patzek and Croft, 2010).
However its opponents, such as Lynch (2003), state that the “work of the Hubbert
modelers has proven to be incorrect in theory, and based heavily on assumptions
that the available evidence shows to be wrong. They have repeatedly misinterpreted
political and economic eﬀects as reﬂecting geological constraints, and misunderstood
the causality underlying exploration, discovery and production”. The main problem
for our analysis of climate policy is that past production can only represent past
economical and political situations. The Hubbert model fails to integrate paradigm
shifts that will aﬀect future production patterns such as the carbon constraints of
climate policy or the high economic growth in Asia. It is thus not suitable for our
purpose.
Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE) have been widely used for cli-
mate policy analyses. For example, Böhringer and Rutherford (2000) analyze the
economic implications of the Kyoto Protocol at the cross-country level, while Böh-
ringer et al. (2010) assess the eﬀects of regional climate policies on industrial sectors’
competitiveness and the scope for carbon leakage, i.e., the increase in carbon emis-
sions outside emissions-regulating regions, e.g., due to relocation. Bovenberg and
Goulder (2005) place greater focus on industries aﬀected by carbon-emissions regu-
lation. Kemfert (2002) assesses potential leakage eﬀects and compensation options
by issue linkage. However, detailed industry, sector or market-level investigations
require modiﬁcations to traditional CGE models which generally exhibit only coarse
representations of the energy sector. One possible modiﬁcation is to integrate top-
down CGE models with bottom-up engineering models (e.g. Böhringer, 1998); an-
other one is to utilize detailed partial equilibrium models that focus speciﬁcally on
4a single market or sector (e.g. Demailly and Quirion, 2008). However, since the fo-
cus and advantage of CGE models is the multi-sectoral analysis and carbon leakage
through relocation eﬀects, they would not be the best ﬁt for the aim of our present
study that focuses solely on interactions between climate policy and the steam coal
market.
More recently resource markets have been investigated using partial equilibrium
modeling techniques with a main focus on market power issues (e.g. Holz et al.,
2008). We show in section 2.3 that partial equilibrium model are also suitable for
climate policy analysis.
2.2 Applicability of standard resource economics models
The classical Hotelling (1931) model is built on the assumption of a known ﬁnite
stock of a resource that will be depleted over time. The resource owner chooses the






subject to the resource constraint for the cumulative extraction:
 T
0
Rt dt = S (2)
The ﬁrst order conditions imply that the net price, or scarcity rent grows expo-
nentially with the interest rate as stated by Hotelling’s eﬃciency rule: Pt = P0eit.
There has been a recent stream of literature using Hotelling type resource eco-
nomics models to assess the reaction of resource markets and resource owners to
climate policies. The ﬁrst and most prominent paper by Hans-Werner Sinn (2008)
also coined the term “green paradox” to describe the potential adverse eﬀect climate
policies may have on total carbon emissions due to the reactions of resource owners.
The underlying mechanisms are highlighted in Figure 1 for a ﬁnite carbon-based
resource. The continuous lines in both graphs representing the price, the net price
and the extraction path show the results of the classic Hotelling model described
above. We use variable non-zero marginal costs to obtain a more realistic extraction
path and a U-shaped price path. According to Sinn (2008), if a demand reducing
climate policy is implemented with increasing intensity in the future, the resource
owners will change the extraction path such that more of the resource is extracted
today. This is represented by the dotted extraction line in Figure 1. This reaction is
only possible by lowering the price to consumers PCt resulting in a lower net price













Figure 1: The eﬀect of demand reducing climate policy in an Hotelling framework
(source: own)
Pt in earlier years. The proﬁt of the resource owners is reduced but they still manage
to sell all of their resource. Sinn (2008) concludes that “demand reducing measures
of the type emphasized by politicians and in the public debate may be useless or
even dangerous”.
For this theory to apply in resource markets, there is one fundamental condition:
the net price Pt or scarcity rent must be strictly positive. In solving a Hotelling
model this is ensured by the optimality conditions (see Perman et al., 1999, p. 175)
with a terminal point in time where the resource stock and the extraction are zero.
But if “the terminal value of the state variables is free, the transversality condition
will always require that the shadow price of the state variable is zero”(Perman et al.,
1999, p. 176). This is the case when the resource stock is very high. Indeed, in the
case of coal, as we can see in Figure 2, the IPCC (2011) estimates that only about
30% of the coal in the ground will be used by 2100. We can also assume that the
entire stock will never be depleted due to climate policies already in place. With this
information it is hard to see how a positive scarcity rent Pt could arise in the time
frame relevant to climate policy, if it ever arises. Without a positive scarcity rent
and assuming a competitive coal market (see Haftendorn and Holz, 2010) the “green
paradox” eﬀect cannot occur on the steam coal market: prices equal the marginal
costs of the marginal supplier and supply follows demand. For the near and middle-
term climate policy eﬀectiveness other eﬀects are more relevant as we show in the
next section.
6Figure 2: Projected carbon emissions from fossil fuels and amounts in the ground
(source: IPCC, 2011)
2.3 Advantages of partial equilibrium models and the COAL-
MOD-World model
Having ruled out the possibility of a large-scale reaction of coal resource owners
to demand reducing climate policies in Section 2.2, and since we want to focus on
the interaction of the coal market with climate policies only (and not with carbon
leakage in general that would require CGE model as described in Section 2.1), we
now concentrate on the remaining market eﬀects. The introduction of heterogeneous
types of climate policies, geographically as well as in the policy type, will aﬀect
the market supply and demand balance both locally and globally. The future use
of coal in the world will be primarily inﬂuenced by climate policies, which will
consequently aﬀect the quantities of steam coal demanded. Quantity eﬀects on the
supply or demand side have price eﬀects on the global market of steam coal and
in turn, as there is an elastic demand for coal, inﬂuence coal consumption. These
“market adjustments”2 can aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of climate policy in a positive or
negative way. Partial equilibrium models are the ideal way to assess these eﬀects
since detailed market eﬀects are at the core of these models.
Comparative static or multi-period scenario analyses have been widely used with
partial equilibrium models, especially in the natural gas sector. Surprisingly, they
2This mechanism has also been described as being part of the carbon leakage mechanisms in the
literature (see Dröge, 2009) but is rarely analyzed. To avoid confusion we restrict the term leakage
only to industrial operations’ relocation and investment eﬀects and introduce the term “market
adjustments” for pure market eﬀects.
7have not been used much for climate policy scenarios yet. One main focus has
been on market power (e.g. Lise and Hobbs, 2008, Holz et al., 2008) and other sce-
narios include demand scenarios, supply modiﬁcations, investment constraints and
disruptions (e.g. Lise et al., 2008, Huppmann et al., 2011). The numerical modeling
literature for the coal market has focused on market power issues (Haftendorn and
Holz, 2010; Paulus and Trüby, 2011b) or infrastructure decisions (Paulus and Trüby,
2011a).
The COALMOD-World model, described in Haftendorn et al., 2010, is a multi-
period partial equilibrium model of the global steam coal market. It calculates
yearly market equilibria for traded prices and quantities for the years 2006, 2010,
2015, 2020, 2025 and 2030 as well as investments in production and transport ca-
pacities between those years. The proﬁt maximizing players are 25 producers and 14
exporters serving a total of 41 demand centers. The market is assumed to be com-
petitive following the results in Haftendorn and Holz (2010). Virtually all worldwide
steam coal demand is included as we model both domestic markets and the global
seaborne market. The level of detail and disaggregation of the COALMOD-World
model allows for a diﬀerentiated analysis of potential market adjustment eﬀects as
a reaction to climate policies.
3 Climate policy scenarios with the COALMOD-
World model
A partial equilibrium model such as the COALMOD-World model allows for a broad
range of possible scenario. Out of this set we have to choose the most relevant
scenarios and ensure scenario consistency.
As stated before, climate policy is expected to be the main driver of steam coal
demand in the future. Thus, we divide the scenario space in three possible futures
of global climate policy intensity as deﬁned by the IEA (2010) World Energy Out-
look (WEO). These scenarios are ordered here from the less intense climate policy
implementation to the most: the Current Policies scenario, the New Policies sce-
nario and the 450 ppm scenario. In the IEA Current Policies scenario, it is assumed
that as of mid-2010 no change in the current policies will be implemented and that
the recently announced commitments are not acted upon. In the New Policies sce-
nario, the recently announced commitments and policies, for example from the 2009
Copenhagen Climate Conference, are fully implemented. Finally the 450 ppm sce-
nario is named after the low carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere that is
reached in order to keep the increase in global average temperatures below 2°C.
8Figure 3: Scenario space
The second division of the scenario space is made by an exogenous market con-
straint. We assume that there are restrictions on production capacity expan-
sions for various reasons that can be geological, technical and economical (ﬁnancial
restrictions, lack of qualiﬁed labor force or equipment). For the constrained case,
the level of these restriction is based on historical capacity data provided by the
USGS in the country reports of the Mineral Yearbook3 and on historical production
data. This is a rather conservative assessment that can be regarded as the upper
bound on the axis of the possible levels of exogenous market constraints. At the
other extreme, these restrictions are completely lifted in the unconstrained case and
the model producers can thus invest in production capacity as much as needed to
maximize their proﬁts.
Figure 3 shows all the scenarios implemented for this paper as the little squares in
their respective scenario space (policy framework and market condition) and, where
it applies, with the additional policy shock implemented. We investigate the eﬀects
of three policy shocks in this paper: a unilateral climate policy by Europe, a restric-
tion of Indonesian coal production and exports, and a fast roll-out of CCS. They are
described in the following Sections 3.2 to 3.4. To ensure scenario consistency and
comparability the shocks are applied to the six reference scenarios (plain-colored
3http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/
9squares) and the results of the policy shock simulations are compared to their re-
spective reference case. The reference cases are calibrated such that for most of the
demand centers the consumed steam coal quantities are in a 10% range above or
below the quantities deﬁned by the IEA (2010) WEO. As our demand functions are
constructed using a reference demand, a reference price and a demand elasticity, we
calibrate the references prices to ﬁt the quantities. We calibrate such that at least
80% of the demand nodes for all model years are in the 10% range above and below
the WEO quantities of their respective scenario.
A diﬃcult issue in partial equilibrium analysis are price elasticities of demand
due to the lack of econometric studies. Paulus and Trüby (2011b) give an overview
of the results of econometric studies that estimate short-term price elasticities for
coal. The range is between -0.05 and -0.57. The elasticities for the base year 2006
are based on our previous work (Haftendorn et al., 2010). The elasticities of the
following years are gradually set higher as we assume that countries will have a more
diverse energy mix and higher ﬂexibility in their power systems in the future.
3.1 Worldwide climate policy
Before we describe the outcomes of the scenarios resulting from an additional policy
shock on an already implemented level of global climate policy, we analyze the model
outcomes from these global climate policies that represent our reference cases. We
have three diﬀerent levels of global climate policy: the Current Policies scenario, the
New Policies scenario and the 450 ppm scenario based on the projections of the IEA
(2010) WEO. Additionally to that policy framework we have to consider the market
conditions as shown in Figure 3. In one case, investments in production capacity
are constrained, in the other case they are not in order to represent two extremes of
a continuum of exogenous market constraints.
Figure 4 shows the results from the diﬀerent modeling runs of the reference cases
in million tons of carbon dioxide emissions. Since the emissions are proportionally
linked to the consumption of coal in energy units we can also infer the development
of consumption and trade from these ﬁgures. The blue area represents the emissions
in the 450 ppm scenario (the same as for the other scenarios in 2010), adding the
green area represents the emissions from the New Policies scenario and all the areas
together show the emissions in the Current Policies scenario.
In the case of unconstrained investment possibilities in production capacity, coal
consumption is signiﬁcantly higher in the Current Policies scenario and slightly
higher in the New Policies scenario. Global seaborne trade remains important and
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Figure 4: Annual carbon dioxide emissions from steam coal consumption in the six
reference scenarios (source: own modeling results)
scenario. In the case of a constrained market condition global seaborne trade is
especially important to help countries like China and India to meet their coal demand
as they might experience in diﬃculties in expanding their domestic production base.
3.2 Unilateral European climate policy
The unilateral European climate policy scenario is implemented in two global climate
policy frameworks: the Current Policies and the New Policies framework as shown
in the scenario overview of Figure 3. In this scenario the European Union goes a
step further and aims at reducing CO2 emissions by 30% compared to the level of
1990 by 2020 with further reductions in the future. This goal is reached through
a signiﬁcantly lower coal consumption in the European Union. In the IEA (2010)
WEO scenarios this is represented by the demand values of the 450 ppm scenario.
The steam coal demand reduction compared to the reference scenarios are shown in
Table 1.
The modeling results are shown in Figure 5. The blue area are represents the
actual emissions reduction in the EU due to the EU unilateral climate policy. The
grey area are the targeted emissions and together with the orange market adjust-
ments they represent the actual global emissions. We can see that, given certain
conditions, market adjustments can seriously undermine a unilateral European cli-
112020 2025 2030
Demand reduction from Current Policies -0.24 -0.43 -0.64
Demand reduction from New Policies -0.02 -0.20 -0.45
Table 1: EU demand reduction in the Unilateral European Climate Policy scenario
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Figure 5: Worldwide emissions reductions and adverse market adjustments in the
Unilateral European Climate Policy model scenario (source: own modeling results)
mate eﬀort. This is especially the case in the Current Policies framework with a
constrained market condition. In that case global coal demand is high and the mar-
ket somewhat constrained so that a reduction in European coal demand allows the
Asian countries to consume signiﬁcantly more. In 2025, the market adjustment nul-
liﬁes 66% of the European reduction target and 29% in 2030. In the unconstrained
case the market adjustment is negligible but global emissions are much higher.
In the New Policies framework the market adjustment is much lower. It is
interesting to note that the market condition has a high impact on the global level
of emissions and on the market adjustment mechanism. In 2030, in the constrained
case the mechanism works as described above for the Current Policies constrained
case: the European reduction allows Asia to consume more through the global price
mechanism. However in the unconstrained case, in 2025, the market adjustment with
considerably lower prices occurs because more quantities are potentially available
when there is no constraint. The lower European consumption has a signiﬁcant
12impact on prices that it has not in the constrained case where global demand remains
slightly restricted.
We can conclude that market adjustments are very likely to occur but that their
adverse eﬀect is generally low and will not overcompensate the emissions reductions
from Europe. This is due to the relatively small size of EU demand in the global
steam coal demand. However, in the case of a low level of global climate policy as
in the Current Policies scenario the adverse market adjustment eﬀect can be very
high. Thus; it is logical for the European Commission to say that it will aim at a
30% emissions reduction goal only if other countries take a binding commitment to
higher reduction goals. In such a case, that can be described by the New Policies
scenario, Europe can always go an extra mile without expecting too much adverse
market adjustments.
3.3 Yasuní-type supply-side policy in Indonesia
The Yasuní-ITT initiative proposed by the Ecuadorian government aims at com-
bating global warming, protecting biodiversity and indigenous people as well as
implementing a sustainable social and energetic development by refraining indeﬁ-
nitely from exploiting the oil reserves of the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT)
oil ﬁeld within the Yasuní National Park (Larrea, 2010).4 This ﬁeld represents 20%
of the Ecuadorian oil reserves and the initiative requires a capital contribution of
at least half of the earnings Ecuador would receive from exploitation. Valuated at
76.38 USD per barrel this represents a sum of 3.635 billion USD supplied by the
international community to a fund managed by the United Nations Development
Programme. The initiative represents 407 Mt CO2 saved from not using the oil
resource and an additional 820 Mt CO2 mitigation potential over 20 years from
avoided deforestation and forest management (Larrea, 2010).
For the Indonesian scenario, we use the same idea and apply it to another geo-
graphic area and to our fuel of interest in this paper, steam coal. The bulk of coal
exploitation in Indonesia takes place on the island of Kalimantan (formerly known
as Borneo). This island is home to one of the greatest rainforests in the world and a
treasure of biodiversity that is endangered by coal mining through deforestation and
local air and water pollution. Fatah (2008) points out that coal mining has little
to no beneﬁcial eﬀects on the local economy. The revenues and beneﬁts go to pri-
vate companies and the government. Thus, one could imagine a supply-side climate
policy mechanism similar to the Yasuní-ITT Initiative to preserve the Indonesian
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Figure 6: Worldwide emissions reduction in the Indonesian supply-side policy sce-
nario. (source: own modeling results)
albeit still allowing a local use of steam coal for power generation. In our particular
case we modeled this policy as an export restriction (maximum quantity that can
be exported in a given year) for Indonesia as follows: 2006 to 2015, no restriction;
2020: 50 Mtpa; 2025: 25 Mtpa; 2030: 0 Mtpa (phase-out of export).
In our reference cases for all policy environments Indonesia is the most important
supplier to the global market with yearly export values that can be higher than
200 Mt. The results of the Indonesia scenario run with export restrictions are
summarized in Figure 6. We see that the reduction eﬀect is the strongest in the
case of a constrained global market because it is hard to ﬁnd alternative suppliers
on the world market that could replace the lacking Indonesian exports. In the
unconstrained case the eﬀect is lower as Indonesian coal is substituted by other
producers. Also we must be wary that such an eﬀect may limited in time as the
supply gap may be covered by other producers over time.
3.4 CCS fast roll-out
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a set of technologies that aim at a reduction of
carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere by separating and capturing the CO2
at the power plant and transporting it to a geological sink where it will be compressed
and stored underground (see IPCC, 2005). The CCS technology is regarded by the
14IPCC and by the IEA to be one of the major options for climate change mitigation.
However, as of 2011 there are only about 10 pilot CCS plants operating in the world
and not a single large scale operation (22 are planned to start operating between
2014 and 2020).5 In the IEA (2010) WEO scenarios, CCS plays a signiﬁcant role
in the 450 ppm scenario after 2025 and a smaller role in the New Policies scenario
but only after 2030. There are various technological and political barriers to the
implementation that explain this late roll-out of the CCS technology (see Gibbins
and Chalmers, 2008).
In our CCS fast roll-out scenario we assume that technological breakthroughs,
a favorable regulatory framework as well as a strong political support create the
conditions for a fast CCS roll-out with signiﬁcant capacities coming in as early
as 2020. Such a scenario makes only sense in an overall environment of ambitious
climate policy, thus we apply this additional policy shock in the New Policies and the
450 ppm policy framework only, as shown in Figure 3. For this scenario we assume
that the worldwide installed capacities of coal power plants with CCS projected by
the IEA (2010) WEO in the 450 ppm scenario are put in place ﬁve years earlier. We
assume that half of this additional capacity replaces existing older coal power plants,
the other half is integrated in the power system as additional capacity, successfully
competing with other technologies. Furthermore for our coal demand calculations,
we assume that CCS power plants have a 38% eﬃciency and a capacity factor of
82%. Thus, we actually compute two additional demand shocks: one coming from
half of the CCS capacity that is added to the coal demand and the other because the
lower eﬃciency of CCS power plants requires additional coal to produce the same
amount of energy. The assumed capacities of CCS for our modeling runs are shown
in Table 2 divided into the following regions: OECD+, Other Major Economies and
Other Countries.6
2020 2025 2030
World 150 286 423
OECD+ (incl. Europe, USA, Japan) 72 134 197
OME (incl. China, Russia, South Africa) 74 145 216
OC (incl. India, South-East Asia) 4 6 9
Table 2: Assumed installed capacities of coal power plants with CCS for the CCS
scenario in GW (source: own calculations based on IEA, 2010)
The results of the CCS scenario are presented in Figure 7. Let us start ana-
lyzing the scenario based on the New Policies climate policy framework. CCS is
5source: Carbon Capture and Sequestration Technologies Program at MIT
(http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/index.html).
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Figure 7: Worldwide emissions in the CCS scenario (source: own modeling results)
insigniﬁcant in the reference scenario and therefore the additional CCS capacity,
half of which leads to new coal demand, has a strong eﬀect on the market. We see
a market adjustment that is positive for the climate. The higher demand leads to
higher prices that lead to a reduction of demand from conventional power plants.
This eﬀect is very strong in a constrained market environment and signiﬁcant in the
unconstrained environment.
In the scenario based on the 450 ppm climate policy environment the global coal
demand is so low that the market condition has very little eﬀect on the scenario
outcomes. However, we observe diﬀerent market adjustment eﬀects. In 2020, there
is very little CCS in the reference case so that the additional demand for coal creates
a market adjustment eﬀect with high prices similar to the one described in the New
Policies case. In 2025, we have an opposite “negative” market adjustment eﬀect
with more emissions. This is due to an eﬀect of decreasing demand with a capacity
eﬀect: in 2020 capacities are build up to serve the additional demand and they
create a slight oversupply situation in 2025. This eﬀect overcompensates the little
CCS addition but is only temporary.
In the case of a relatively intense global level of climate policy, such as in the
New Policies framework, a faster implementation of CCS would be very beneﬁcial.
We expect that, additionally to the captured quantities of CO2, a positive market
adjustment will further reduce coal consumption and emissions. The picture is less
16clear in the 450 ppm case. But in the case this very ambitious climate scenario
becomes reality in the future, some amount of market adjustment on the steam
coal market has little relevance in the overall required transformation of the global
energy system anyways.
4 Conclusions and policy recommendations
Using the COALMOD-World model we are able to make diﬀerentiated conclusions
about the eﬃciency of diﬀerent types of climate policy alternatives through their
interplay with the global coal market in various market conditions.
If we take a European and policy-oriented view of this results, several conclusions
and recommendations can be drawn to prioritize diﬀerent climate policy options. In
the case of a European unilateral climate policy in a context of little global climate
eﬀort, we can expect adverse market adjustment eﬀects that can compensate up
to 2/3 of European emissions reductions. Thus the ﬁrst priority of the European
climate policy should be to reach a global level of climate policy that is at least
at the level of the non-binding agreements taken in recent climate conferences in
Copenhagen in 2009 and in
in 2010. A global climate policy has the biggest eﬀect on global carbon emissions
coming from the coal sector. If this is reached the EU can always go further in
reducing its steam coal consumption without risking too much adverse eﬀects from
the global market.
A supply-side climate policy in Indonesia also has some signiﬁcant CO2 emissions
reduction eﬀects that are potentially in the same order of magnitude as the European
unilateral climate policy. It is interesting to note that this supply-side policy has
its best performance in the context where the European unilateral climate policy
sees the most important negative market adjustment eﬀects, i.e. when there is a
low intensity of global climate policy and when the market is constrained. Thus
the EU could try and pursue such an unconventional climate policy as a way to
hedge against adverse eﬀects from its own domestic climate policy. Such a policy in
Indonesia would also have additional beneﬁcial eﬀects for nature conservation, the
protection of biodiversity as well as avoided CO2 emission from deforestation.
The ﬁrst advantage of a policy that aims at a faster roll-out of the CCS technology
is the emissions reduction through the capture of CO2. Climate beneﬁcial market
adjustment eﬀects can also occur. A signiﬁcant impact of CCS can only be expected
if this technology is implemented globally. Thus the strategy of the EU should
be to support the roll-out of this technology in Europe but also abroad through
international cooperation.
17If we rank all the diﬀerent policy options examined in this paper using the
COALMOD-World model with regard to their eﬀectiveness in reducing carbon emis-
sions from steam coal use on a global level, we obtain the following order of priority
for EU climate policy. First, the EU should aim at establishing a strong globally
binding climate agreement. Secondly, the EU should support a fast roll-out of CCS,
both in the EU and globally. Thirdly, on the same level, the EU can set a more
stringent emissions reduction goal for itself and be open to more unconventional
climate policies such as the described supply-side reduction in Indonesia through
production and export limitations.
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21Appendix
Demand node 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
C_NFB -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_ITA -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_RUS_Siberia -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_RUS_Central -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_CAN -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_THA -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_VNM -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_ESP -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_FIN -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_JPN -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_TUR -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_DEU -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
C_PRT -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_PHL -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_MYS -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_MNG -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_UKR -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_GBR -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_KOR -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_IDN -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_USA_Rocky -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_USA_Central -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_USA_South -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_USA_Gulf -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_USA_East -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
C_DNK -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_TWN -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_MAR -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_IND_East -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_IND_North -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_IND_West -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_IND_South -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_ISR -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_KAZ -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_CHN_Northeast -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_CHN_SIS -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_CHN_Main -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_CHN_Eastern -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_CHN_South -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_POL -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
C_ZAF -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Table 3: Demand elasticities
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